

Immanuel Wallerstein's Theory of the World System, Geopolitics and Geoculture

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Abstract

A world system theorist, Immanuel Wallerstein attempts to describe a modern world system covering economic, political and cultural areas. In his theory, he argues that the conflicts between the countries which determine the world order in these areas are not true conflicts because the modern world system is built on a capitalist economic basis. He regards powerful states such as the United States of America, Russia, Japan and European States, which seem to be engaged in a competition, as global collaborators of a single modern world system. At the head of this cooperation is the United States of America and the world system is based on the hegemony of the United States of America. Wallerstein maintains that the modern world system is fragile due to economic crises that are likely to arise and regards the period we are in as a post-liberalism period where this hegemony has begun to collapse.

Keywords: *Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System, Geopolitics, Geoculture.*

A. INTRODUCTION

World-system theorist Immanuel Wallerstein, as an American-born thinker, has an important place in sociology and political literature as he criticizes the worldwide effects of the American economic and political system. Wallerstein developed his views in the framework of the world system, economic and cultural diffusion, center-periphery (dependency).

Wallerstein attributes the world system to the hegemonic American power to develop all alternative policies within its own ideology, despite all the appearances of political conflict. In this respect, structures that seem like alternatives to American politics, in their own words, anti-system movements actually serve the purpose of the system (Blazhevsja, 2022; Trubina et al., 2020). Neither the Soviet regime nor the efforts of the third world are outside the system. Despite these views, Wallerstein does not perceive the world system as perfect or infinite. On the contrary, it emphasizes the devastating crisis of liberalism and the world system (Bergesan & Suter, 2018; Dobos, 2020). Because the sovereignty of states is an ideological myth. Modern states have never been a fully autonomous political entity. States have developed and been shaped as an integral form of an interstate system, which consists of a set of rules in their operation that they must abide by and a set of legitimators without which they cannot live (Flint & Zhu, 2019; Luke, 2020). The rules of the interstate system are

undoubtedly implemented not by consent or consensus, but by the willingness and ability of strong states to impose rules on weaker states, and secondly, on each other (Cairo & Bringel, 2019). States have never been autonomous entities, but rather form the main institutional features of the modern system, and some states have more power than others (Agnew, 2021; peters et al., 2022). For this reason, the periodic crises of the capitalist economic mode of production owned by the sovereign states and the conflicts among themselves prevent the world system from functioning perfectly.

Wallerstein bases the world system on an economic basis, but also emphasizes the ideology and cultural background of the system. Thus, as a whole, he puts forward a political, sociological and historical theory of the world system. Wallerstein's thoughts are based on systematizing economic, political and cultural events and relations, which are seen as independent from each other and rather as local effects and results, by linking them together in a large structure. In a sense, this is trying to describe a large and single society, whose functional parts are states, interconnected by various fields such as economy, politics and culture (Enami et al., 2021; Molchanov, 2019).

Wallerstein's world system theory includes dependency, periphery-center relations. In these relations, the concepts of geopolitics and geoculture gain importance (Cohen, 2018; Dierwechter, 2020). Geopolitics and geoculture are concepts with dual meanings used to express both the economic and political hegemony originating from the USA and the resistance of the underdeveloped countries against this hegemony (Bergesen, 2018; Dehghani & Chechrazad, 2022). All these conceptualizations actually reveal Wallerstein's understanding of globalization. In this respect, global relations are nothing but the world system, that is, the hegemony of the USA. The ideology of this hegemony is liberalism. But liberalism, according to him, is not an ideology that can sustain its dominance any longer. It has completed its time and now the post-liberal era has been entered (Grinin, 2022; Pennaforte & Luigi, 2022). In this study, his views on the world system, geopolitics, geoculture and cultural globalization are emphasized by conveying these ideas in his works.

B. METHOD

This research uses qualitative research with descriptive analysis approach. The type of data used in this research is secondary data with a literature study method on Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of the World System, Geopolitics and Geoculture in this century. The type of data presentation in this study is a qualitative method.

C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Modern World System

The world system is primarily based on the capitalist world economy. The capitalist world economy is a system that includes a hierarchical distribution inequality based on the concentration of certain types of production, namely the capitalist mode of production, in certain limited regions of capital accumulation in a historical process. This concentration makes it possible to support state structures that

will seek to secure the survival of capitalist monopolies. But since monopolies are inherently fragile, these concentration centers of the modern world system have been sometimes fixed, sometimes discontinuous and limited throughout history. But they have always faced significant repositioning (Wang & Zhang, 2020). The change mechanisms of repositioning are Kondratieff cycles, which are cyclical rhythms. These cycles represent the transformation of profit sources between the fields of production and finance in 50-60 year periods. Kondratieff A periods are production and high profit periods, while Kondratieff B periods are financial income and low profit periods.

These cycles show parallelism with economic and political developments. For example, the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR were evaluated as the collapse of communism and Marxism-Leninism as an ideological force in the modern world. These events are true and celebrated as the final victory of liberalism as an ideology. However, this perception of victory is a complete misconception of reality (Baik, 2019). On the contrary, the same events show, to an even greater degree, the collapse of liberalism and our definitive arrival in the post-liberal world. According to Wallerstein's historical sociology, liberalism emerged on the stage of history after the French Revolution, initially prevailing in only a few states, then quickly rose to victory as the dominant ideology in the world system, and has been equally abruptly dethroned in the last few years. The year 1989 was generally evaluated as the end of the 1945-1989 period, in other words, as the year that showed the defeat of the USSR in the cold war. In fact, it would be more accurate to consider the year in question as the end of the 1789-1989 period, that is, the triumph and collapse, rise and decline of liberalism, which is the global ideology and geoculture of the modern world system. Thus, the year 1989 will mark the end of a political-cultural era in which most people believe the slogans of the French Revolution reflect the undisputed historical reality that will occur today or in the near future.

The roots of liberalism, based on the political upheavals initiated by the French revolution, have been discussed at length. While most analysts agree that liberalism triumphed in Europe by 1914, some argue that the decline began from that time. Wallerstein, on the other hand, argues that the culmination of liberalism took place during the period of US hegemony in the world system, from the post-1945 period to 1968. There are also views on how liberalism triumphed and its fundamental links with racism and Eurocentrism. The most compelling idea, according to Wallerstein, is to argue that the collapse of communism represents not the eventual success of liberalism as an ideology, but a definitive weakening of liberal ideology's ability to maintain its historical role. Finally, according to Wallerstein, the US hegemony period has ended in the world system covering the 1945-1990 periods, and the post-hegemony period has been entered (An et al., 2021).

The modern world system is a capitalist world economy and is dominated by the endless drive to accumulate capital. This world system expanded over the centuries and included other parts of the world, respectively, into the division of labor it created (Wallerstein, 2000: 44-45). This division of labor includes Europe, Russia, the

Far East and Africa. Wallerstein (1998a: 19-26) collects the basic features of the world system in the 1945-1990 period and the relations of the vast geography with the USA in four points.

The first point is the formation of the roof of the world system, the USA is the hegemonic power in a unipolar world system in this period (1945-1990), its power based on the overwhelming superiority it has achieved in economic efficiency since 1945 and the alliance system it has established with Western Europe-Japan reached its peak around 1967-1973. . By quickly institutionalizing its military and economic advantage, the USA was able to create a hegemony that enabled it to effectively control or direct all important decisions in the world political and economic arenas for about twenty-five years. This hegemony of the USA is ideological and even cultural at the same time. As a result of the division of labor between Western Europe and Japan, the economic reward has been economic reconstruction. This means guaranteeing both political satisfaction and an important market for US manufacturing companies. In fact, this period is referred to as US leadership, since for about twenty-five years all major political decisions in the world system were made by a small elite in the United States. Western Europe and Japan are the driven states in this case.

The second point is related to the structure of the system, during this period (1945-1990) the USA and the USSR entered into a conflict in a highly structured, carefully restrained, form, in which the USSR acted as a sub-imperialist agent of the USA. Similarly, the surface appearance of the US-USSR relationship was different, the underlying reality was different. They represented alternative visions of the well-being of society, based on quite different interpretations of historical reality. The socio-political structures of the two countries were quite incompatible and in some ways radically different. However, the real situation was completely different. II in Europe. At the end of the world war, a line was drawn roughly along where Soviet and US troops had met. This line divided Europe into two regions. This arrangement had two important issues. First, both regions would seek absolute peace between states in Europe and refrain from any attempt to change or overthrow governments in the other region. Second, the USSR would not expect or receive US assistance in its economic reconstruction. While the US government concentrated its financial resources on Western Europe and Japan, it would be possible for the USSR to take as much as it could from Eastern Europe. For these reasons, the USSR can be considered as a sub-imperialist power of the USA. Because while the USSR sought to guarantee order and stability in its region, it actually helped conditions that improved the US's ability to maintain its worldwide hegemony.

The third point concerns the periphery of the system, the third world attracted the attention of the USA, the USSR and Western Europe by demanding more complete rights earlier than the northern countries had envisaged and wished. In 1945 no one saw the third world as a political actor to be taken seriously on the world stage. Undoubtedly, the USA had a program for the third world. This was proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson in 1917 and was called the self-determination of nations. This

program of Wilson deeply affected the third world countries and the empire states of the period. Russian-originated Leninism appeared as an alternative to Wilson's principles. As an ideology, Leninism was assumed to be the opposite of Wilsonianism. In many ways, however, Leninism was Wilsonism in disguise. It was essentially the same as the Wilsonian program. Because, like Wilsonism in Leninism, it aimed at first the political change that would establish a new dominance, and then the economic change that included the establishment of an effective state bureaucracy, the development of the production process (industrialization) and the creation of a social infrastructure. The result promised by both Wilsonians and Leninists was to bridge the gap, to bridge the gap between rich and poor countries.

The final point is the crisis of the system, the 1970s and 1980s were a time of global recession, US resistance to impending decline, and the disillusionment of the third world with its own strategy. By 1970, the United States had reached the peak and limit of its power. Melting gold reserves forced him to abandon the fixed gold-dollar parity. Just as Kondratief entered phase B, the economic growth of Western Europe and Japan was now catching up with and outstripping US productivity levels. More precisely, the main source of the decline was the development of global production itself. According to Wallerstein, we are at the extreme end of the Kondratieff phase B, which has been going on since 1967-1973. We are on the verge of the last and probably the most dramatic sinking. This is analogous to the sinking of Kondratieff phase B, which lasted from 1873 to 1896. Its impact will vary in different parts of the north, but will likely be greater in most parts of the south. However, after the world economy is shaken from head to toe, we will exit this phase and enter another Kondratief A phase. This upswing will be fed from the production chain of new leading industries (such as microchips, biogenetics) as was already anticipated at the beginning. The three key sites of this type of production would be the focus of power, Japan, the EEC (today's European Union) and the USA. They will compete fiercely for what could be called monopolistic control of the world market for their particular technical version of such products, but not all will be able to achieve it all at once.

Again, these days, at the center of these three power centers, there is talk of the three-way fragmentation of the world market. However, in such a fierce rivalry, triads lead to a double separation, the risks are high, and the weakest of the three opponents will seek an alliance with one of the other two for fear of being crushed completely. Today, the weakest of the three in terms of production capability and national financial stability is the United States, and it will undoubtedly be so in the next decade. The natural alliance is with Japan. With this thesis, Wallerstein states that the existing order in determining the world market will change due to new production areas and modes of production, in this case, the equality will be broken, but the world system will continue with new mergers established between the same actors.

Although new alliances are formed, Wallerstein argues that the period from 1990 to 2025-2050 will most likely suffer a lack of peace, stability and legitimacy. This is partly due to the weakening of the USA, the hegemonic power of the world system.

But the real reason is the crisis in the capitalist economy, which is the basis of the modern world system.

Consequently, hegemony in the world system by definition means the existence of a geopolitically situated power to impose a permanent articulation of the distribution of social stability. This primarily marks a period of peace, which means the absence of military struggle. Such periods of true hegemony, in which hegemonic power can impose its will and order on other great powers without facing serious challenge, are relatively brief periods in the history of the modern world system.

In these periods, alternative formations to the world system and movements against the political system may emerge. The most prominent of the antisystemic movements appears in Marxist analysis as the proletarian movement. Proletarian anti-capitalist movements and nationalist anti-imperialist movements are anti-system movements that sometimes take the form of national liberation movements. Particularly in the 19th century, movements that emerged to counter the pressure of employers on wage earners (bourgeois on the proletariat) were considered as social movements and movements that emerged to remove the pressure of one ethnic-national group on the other, as national movements. The difference between them is that the source of the oppression is evaluated differently.

The similarity between them is the official organizations they established to realize the social transformation. Formal organization refers to the state apparatuses for such movements. Social movements in northern countries called core countries; national movements are trying to seize the state apparatus in peripheral countries such as the third world. Another feature of these movements is that none of them have been as successful as expected. Revolts against the system have been discontinuous, disorganized, disjointed, and partially effective because “anti-system movements have been, are, and must be natural products of the world-system geoculture”. According to this thought of Wallerstein, the anti-system movements that emerged in order to create alternative structures against the order created by the capitalist world system do not give the expected result, and it can be seen that many anti-system movements are articulated to the capitalist world economy and are included in the system.

2. Geopolitics, Geoculture and Development

According to Wallerstein, geopolitics refers to the world of hegemonic countries that encompass the entire world geography and operate as functional parts of a world system. Throughout history, there have been hegemonic countries that have determined geopolitics at certain periods, “one of the basic structures of the capitalist world economy is the cyclical rise and fall of hegemonies within the world system” (Wallerstein, 1998b: 17). The last of the hegemonies is the hegemony of the USA, and it begins with the end of Britain's economic dominance, that is, the period when its hegemony ends. The geopolitics of this period was in the form of violent and uncertain alliance changes that the USA, Russia and Germany continued in the balance of power. Competition and alliances between these powers continued for

many years in the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions of the world economy, namely in the non-European world and countries such as Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, the Ottoman Empire, China, Mexico, South America, and the Caribbean (Wallerstein, 1998b: 18). . Peripheral countries were necessary to ensure the continuation of the world system based on the capitalist world economy of the hegemonic core countries, and they were also the resources that ensure the continuation of the core countries.

Wallerstein points to the influence of the French Revolution in determining the recent geopolitics, “The main impact of the French revolution on the capitalist world economy was the cultural maturation of a value system most compatible with the endless accumulation of capital, this event transformed political consciousness” (Wallerstein, 1998b: 24). This cultural development and mental transformation was the transformation of the capitalist mentality and at the same time formed the background of geoculture. The cultural dimension of the capitalist world economic order was hidden here. The French Revolution and the political currents that emerged after it also consolidated the capitalist culture. Both conservatism, liberalism and socialism aimed at overproduction and development enriched by the socio-cultural values of the French revolution.

Three major political ideologies emerged in the century: conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. Since then, these three have been at war with each other. Two generalizations about these ideological struggles are virtually universally accepted. One of the generalizations is that each of these ideologies is somewhat of a response to the development of new common points of view, which has given rise to the notion that certain political strategies are necessary to deal with a situation that has just emerged in the wake of the French Revolution. The second is that none of these three ideologies has ever shriveled into a definitive version. On the contrary, each one seems to take on as many forms as there are ideologues (Wallerstein, 1998a: 76). These political ideologies are like opposites of each other. However, the situations that arise with practice are the same in terms of their purpose or desired results. This sameness is based on their liberal economic policies. For this reason, Wallerstein draws attention to the development issue while evaluating these political ideologies in terms of geopolitics and geoculture.

When we look at the world economic history, European thinkers have been discussing how to increase the wealth of the country since at least the 16th century, and governments are trying to protect and develop this wealth, or they are asked to take steps in this regard. It is clear from this that it was a fundamental ideological theme of the capitalist world-economy that every state could and would eventually achieve a high level of national income; He believed that conscious, rational activity could achieve this. This belief was well suited to the important, inevitable theme of progress of the Enlightenment, and the teleological view of human history it embodied. For these reasons, it is useful to mention once again the political economy of Wilsonism and Leninism for Wallerstein. The year 1917 is often considered an ideological turning point in the history of the modern world system. But this is not

exactly the way it is always advocated. Because in the 20th century, a great ideological contrast, namely Wilsonism-Leninism, was born in 1917. However, contrary to the general opinion, this contrast, far from continuing, died in 1989. Furthermore, the political integration of the periphery of the world system is the key issue to which both ideologies are oriented, and finally, the mechanism for such integration (periphery-centre consolidation) is national development, both for Wilsonism and for Leninism, and the main disagreement between the two ideologies is purely verbal. issue is about the path to national development.

The idea of development within the world capitalist economy has existed since the 16th century (Wallerstein, 2001: 19). National development, on the other hand, is a term that has gained wide currency in the social sciences and public policy fields since the 1950s. Culture is a new term that was reintroduced into these fields with great success and a new emphasis in the 1970s. The concept of culture is considered as an obstacle to development in the 1945-1970 period. Since the 1970s, neither technical assistance nor reform has seemed to work for national development. The economic situation in most countries has noticeably worsened. The idea that aid is neutral has yielded bitter results as many countries enter a circle of very high foreign debt capital flight and negative investment. As a result, culture, which was claimed to be an obstacle to be removed as quickly as possible between 1945 and 1970, has now re-emerged in the guise of a resistance towards degeneration, fragmentation and the worsening of the economic and political situation as a result of the increasing commodification of everything. This understanding has created a geocultural development ideology for the underdeveloped countries other than the developed capitalist countries that are trying to develop. The geoculture of development, the historical construction of cultural pressure for all states to pursue a program of modernization or development, has led us to the impasse in which we find ourselves today. We were freed from the spell of development as it was preached in the 1945-1970 period, because we realized that it would get us nowhere (Wallerstein, 1998a: 156-162).

The use of culture for development in underdeveloped countries was initially in the form of trying to establish a culture of capitalist accumulation. Later, this accumulation culture turned into an anti-imperialist development culture as it caused inequalities that were not seen before in traditional structures. Thus, Wallerstein also takes into account the cultural aspect of the world system based on the capitalist economy. It points to the place of culture in this system and shows the role of culture both as a connector and as a separator.

In addition, the most critical repulsive point and soft underbelly of the geoculture of the current world order is the Western ideology of material civilization and Eurocentrism. With these ideologies, Westerners defined their own values as universal values and imposed their special values on the rest of the world. This situation was met with reaction especially in the surrounding countries. This is the mental background of anti-imperialist movements.

3. One World Culture and Globalization in Terms of Geoculture

Wallerstein culture does not separate the stereotyping of culture from the economic and politically based world system. He bases his analysis of culture and globalization on the world system governed by capitalist tendencies. The geopolitics and geoculture of the modern world system is to uniformize work and lifestyles, thus establishing a global system.

Culture has an important place in globalization debates as much as economic organizations. It is argued that apart from the fact that culture differentiates societies and causes national conflicts, it is similar within the framework of the world system. The first of the views put forward regarding this resemblance is the linear orientation thesis leading to one world. Initially, it was argued that the world consisted of a large number of distinct and distinctive groups. With the help of science and technology, the groups gradually expanded their field of activity and started to move towards a single world, a single economic world, a single cultural world. According to Wallerstein, we have not reached this point yet regarding culture. However, the transition to a single culture in the future is clearly visible before us. In the second explanation, it is argued that the historical difference between all groups is always superficial. This is undoubtedly the theory of gradual development of man, which has been very popular in modern social science from its inception. In this form of theorizing, he arrives at a conclusion similar to the one in worldly orientation theory, since all societies pass through similar stages. A single human society and therefore inevitably a single world culture is achieved. After drawing attention to these explanations, Wallerstein asks the question of whether there is a world culture. According to him, it can be clearly seen that there is intense resistance to the very idea itself.

On the one hand, this resistance takes the form of multiple political chauvinisms that are constantly trying to surface around the world. On the other hand, it takes the form of multiple countercultures that seem constantly poised to swell, and that always see loud, violent protests as a struggle against stereotyping. Wallerstein thinks that both classical explanations, the earthly orientation leading to one world or the theories of human gradual development, cannot be very useful models. The main reason for his initial skepticism about a world culture stems from his sense that defining a culture is concerned with defining political boundaries. Cultural boundaries will necessarily be arbitrary. Because the decision to draw the boundaries from this point and not from this point is rarely based on sound logic. For example, not all Arabs speak Arabic; not all Brits are individualists; Some Jews and some Muslims are also atheists. No matter how a culture is defined, what is clear is that not all members of cultural groups embrace all the values that are supposed to belong to that group or share group-specific practices. So in what sense does such a group share a culture? or why cultural boundaries are drawn where they are drawn.

In this sense, world history has developed in the opposite direction of a trend towards cultural homogenization. There is always a tendency towards more cultural differentiation or cultural deepening or cultural complexity. However, it is known that

this centrifugal process did not lead to a tower of Babel, to a purely cultural anarchy. There seem to be gravitational forces that limit and regulate these centrifugal tendencies. According to Wallerstein, these attraction forces are nation states. In other words, the nation-state has been the single most powerful cultural attraction in our modern world system. The nation-states that have begun to emerge are a very special type of state in the development process of the capitalist world economy. Because they define themselves by the functions of other states with which they form an interstate system. The nation-state has boundaries that are finalized by the recognition of other states in a process that is formalized not only by national decisions but generally by agreements. There are some additional de facto rules in the creation of the interstate system. No territory that is not part of a particular state should ever be a no-man's land. Moreover, all the resulting states must be legally equal. In other words, each should be dominant. Nation states should be a functional part of the world system, relying on their own sovereignty and making their own decisions. Ostensibly, the world system provides this facility to nation-states. However, it is not possible for any of them to live independently, economically, politically and culturally.

Wallerstein points to the approach of Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto while describing the nation-states that are the basis of cultures in the modern world system. The view that workers do not have a homeland supports the idea that the modern world system has an effect instead of national culture in the determination of cultural identities. According to Wallerstein, both nationalism and internationalism emerged with the historical process of capitalism. These currents both supported the world system and became the basis for anti-system movements. For this reason, the sense of identity of these ideological currents did not derive from the original historical culture. They positioned their identities according to the culture of the modern world system. Because the peoples with these identities were the created peoples of the modern world. Even if the old cultures were not thrown aside, national identities and national cultures were the product of the capitalist, liberal understanding of production and society, in short, the modern world system.

In a world system including culture, it took several centuries to include all nations or regions in this socio-cultural system, to make each part share the same formal characteristics, and to ensure that easily changeable borders are settled. Compared to 1648, the year in which the European state system was consolidated, the post-1945 phase of the world system is a model of legal clarity and stability. In the process of development, this system not only structured the state units, but also defined the relationship of each individual with the nation-state. Another reality in the development of the system is the economic reality. Our modern world system is a capitalist world economy. It works by giving priority to uninterrupted capital accumulation and this capital accumulation is used in the most efficient way since a very wide division of labor is created geographically. Today, there is a worldwide division of labor.

A division of labor requires flows, flows of commodities, flows of capital, flows of labor. This means that state borders are permeable, and they are. At the very

moment when different national cultures are created, these flows eliminate national differences. These flows also eliminate cultural differences in some regions through simple diffusion. This is what we mean when we speak of strikingly continuous internationalization, even in the least likely areas of culture, in daily life, food habits, clothing styles, residential areas, and the arts. Thus, the world system established by the capitalist world economy enables the cultural elements to be articulated to this world system, as well as the economic and political elements. It creates a perception of a universal world that includes all elements of culture. The phenomenon called globalization is actually the globalization of this world system, which consists of the integration of economic, political and cultural elements. Thus, a universal socio-cultural structure is formed that transcends groups that have a unique culture, namely small groups, ethnic groups and national groups.

Wallerstein emphasizes the existence of different or unique cultures. He thinks that cultures are maintained by preserving their differences within national borders. Therefore, he is not talking about a single type of culture that emerged spontaneously. Flows, collaborations and the system itself within the global economy will cause cultures to resemble each other and become uniform over time.

D. CONCLUSION

Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory is based on the global dominance of the capitalist economy. However, not only the economy, but also politics and culture are parts of the system. In modern world system theory, politics and culture determine the geopolitics and geoculture of the system. Crises occurring in the capitalist economy require the system to be revised. It is the crises of the capitalist economy experienced in certain periods, not the anti-system movements and the alternative politics or culture created by these movements that are expected to change the world system, even if it does not abolish it. Conventional forms of production have returned. Wallerstein thinks that the modern world system is in a period of economic crisis and that this crisis period has serious effects. Being aware of this situation, the leading countries of the world system will develop microprocessors, genetic engineering and new energy resources in order to keep their industrial sectors alive between 2000-2050. However, this venture will not bring high profits as in industrial and technology production, so it will make a profit on the total profit it will bring on the world scale instead of the per unit profit of the products. At the same time, profit sharing will not be equal, which means new political arrangements. Most of the old technology, steel, automobile, chemicals and electronics industries will be placed in semi-peripheral countries that are other members of the world system.

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